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ABSTRACT
Thispaper shows, using a standard CAPM model of security prices in a world market,
that even small countries can affect the price ofdomestically issued risky securities, while
large countries can affect the prices of all securities. As a result, countries have theincentive
to set tax rates such that in equilibrium investors specialize in domesticsecurities, and
net capital flows between countries are restricted. Eachcountry does this to increase the
utility of domestic residents, taking as given the tax policies of othergovernments, but the
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Whenever a country is large enough to be able to affect the international price of
a commodity that it trades in, then it will be tempted to set its policy so as to take
advantage of this market power, at least so long as it can ignore any threat of retaliation
by other countries. This observation forms the basis for a variety of results in the trade
literature. For example, when a country can affect the price of its exported goods, then it
will find tariffs or direct restrictions on exports attractive.1 Similarly, if a country is a net
demander (supplier) of capital, and faces a nonhorizontal supply (demand)curve, then it
may attempt to restrict its net demand (supply).2
The objective of this paper is to explore characteristics of government tax policy and
equilibrium resource allocation when countries are not price-takers in the international
market for financial securites. Due to risk aversion, the foreign demand for domestic
securities should be downward sloping —foreigninvestors need more attractive terms
to induce them to concentrate their portfolios further in any one security. Similarly, the
supply curve of foreign securites should be upward sloping. The above observations suggest
that each country would face the incentive to reduce both its net supply of domestic
securities to foreigners and its net demand for foreign securities. When each country
sets its policy accordingly, the net result will be restricted international trade in financial
securities.
Since governments have much more market power than any one firm, it is not surpris-
ing that at least large countries should have an incentive to restrict international trade in
financial securities. However, we show that each country continues to have marketpower
over the price of the equity of domestic firms even as the number of countries becomes large,
so that even small countries have the incentive to restrict foreign ownership of domestic
1equity. In contrast, only large countries have an incentive to restrict domestic ownership
of foreign equity, or to restrict net capital flows.
This intervention can take many forms. Direct controls on the outflow of capital is
obviously one device. To restrict foreign ownership of domestic equity, a dividend with-
holding tax on dividends sent to foreigners, or a dividend credit available only to domestic
residents, can be used. In addition a corporate tax can be used to restrict the total supply
of equity in the domestic firms. One way to restrict inflows of capital is to impose extra
fees on multinational entrants to a country. Each of these policies is commonly observed,
and each seems to us to be difficult to explain on other grounds.
Our results also provide one possible explanation for two empirical puzzles. The first
is why individual portfolios are so highly concentrated in domestic securities. From a direct
application of standard results in finance, one would expect investors to hold a fraction
of the world portfolio of risky securities.3 Our model implies that governments have an
incentive to induce investors to concentrate their portfolios in domestic equity.
The second puzzle, posed by Feldstein-Horioka(1980), is why net capital flows between
countries are so small. Empirically, a country's savings and investment rates are very
closely tied, even though these rates differ dramatically across countries. Our model implies
that, at least in large countries, governments have an incentive to restrict net capital flows,
to limit adverse movements in the interest rate.
Our analysis of optimal government policy, when a country is not a price-taker in
the financial markets, is related to various aspects of the papers by Stiglitz(1972), Jensen-
Long(1972), Ekern-Wilson(1974) and Leland(1974), which examine the optimal investment
behavior of a firm which is not a price—taker in the financial market. We assume that asset
prices satisfy the CAPM equation, as did Stiglitz and Jensen-Long. However, we also
assume that the government acts in the best interests of its citizens, which relates more
closely to the work by Ekern-Wilson and Leland, in which firms are assumed to act in the
best interests of their shareholders.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic
assumptions of our model, and then derive the characteristics of the market equilibrium
in the face of arbitrary tax policy in each country. In section 2, we examine the Nash
equilbrium for government policy when each government chooses its tax rates to maximize
the welfare of its citizens, taking as given the tax policies of other governments. Since many
complicated interaction effects can arise in general, we develop in this section a variety of
special cases. In section 3, we provide a summary and discussion of the main results.
1. Characteristics of the model
1.1Behaviorof individual consumers and individual firms
Our economy consists of N different countries, and operates for two periods. In each
country n, there are I, identical individuals and M identical firms. There is only one
good in the economy, which is tradeable, which can be used in the first period for either
consumption or investment, and which is entirely consumed in the second period.4
2Each firm f in country n invests some amount ofcapital, K1, in the first period and
produces a stochastic amount of output, 6F(K1), in the secondperiod. Here, F is a
nonstochastjc (weakly) concave function, and 9,, is anormally distributed random variable with mean .Theoriginal capital is assumed to depreciate completely. Thisoutput, net
of depreciation, is subject to a corporate income tax at rater,, but the resulting revenue is
assumed to be returned to the firm in a lump-sum,L1, thereby avoiding any income effects
from the tax. Therefore the firm's owners receiveR1 OF1 —r(9,F1 —K1)+ Ljn OF1, in the second period.
The firm in the first period "goes public" and sells shares ofownership in this return to
individual investors. Denote the market value of these sharesby V1, where V1 ,implicitly
depends on the amount of capital K1 that the firm promises to acquire. The initialowners
of the firm when it goes public then divide the residualV1,,, —Kfamong themselves. Since
all firms in country n are identical, we let V,, =MV1denote their aggregate market
value, K =MK1denote their aggregate investment, and R =MR1denote their
aggregate return.
Before going public, each firm must decide how muchcapital it will promise to acquire.
We assume that in doing so the firm maximizes the value of theresidual V1 —Kfgoing to its initial owners.
Each individual i in country n starts in the first period with wealthW1,,, and an initial
ownership share ä in the firms in each country m. He must then decide howto divide
these initial assets between first-periodconsumption, final ownership shares, s, and
riskiess bonds, Riskiess bonds pay an interest rater, and the net supply of bonds in
the world economy is zero. The individual decideson this division of his wealth subject to
the budget constraint
C+Bin+8Vm=Win+>tfl(Vm_K) (1)
In the second period, he receives the income from his investments.However, any interest income is subject to tax at rate t,, whileany income from firms in country m is
subject to tax at rate g,,.5 The resulting tax revenue is assumed to be returnedto the
individual by a lump sum transfer, so that there are no income effects from the taxes,
only price effects. Therefore, consumption in the second period, C, mustsatisfy
C =(1+r(1 —t))B+s(Rm — gmn(Rm—Vm))+
(2)
Individuals choose values for C and the variouss, allowingto adjust according
to the budget constraint, so as to maximize the utility function
U(C, C?) = —e_' —
= —
(3)
3Here b,-1. is the constant absolute risk aversion parameter, p is a time preference parameter,
and Eisan expectations operator. The second line of equation (3) follows since Cis
distributed normally. Assuming that the utility function has constant absolute risk aversion
is obviously restrictive, but simplifies the following discussion significantly by allowing us
to use mean-variance analysis with a constant trade-off between mean and variance.
The resulting first order conditions, after some simplification, can be expressed as
=p(i+ r(1 —tn))Ee_bv1,and (4a)
ERm =(1+ amnr)Vm + bncov(Rm,C,j, (4b)
where, amn (1—t)/(1—g,). Equation (4b) corresponds closely to the standard CAPM
equation with taxes, as appears for example in Brennan(1970) or Gordon-Bradford(1980).
1.Characteristicsofthecompetitive equilibrium in the world economy
The world economy is in equilibrium when each individual is maximizing utility given
market prices, so equations (4a-b) are satisfied, when each firm has chosen that capital
stock which maximizes the value of its residual claim, and when supply equals demand
for each security. One useful characteristic of the resulting equilibrium can be derived by
aggregating the equations (4b) across individuals for each security. In particular, if we
divide equations (4b) for each individual by b and sum across individuals, we get
ERm >(I/b) =[(IIb)
+ r (cxmnIn/bn)] Vm + Cov(Rm, (5a)
This equation can be reexpressed, using equation (2), as
ERm (1+ cxmr)Vm + BCOV(Rm,R). (5b)
HereB 1/(>(I,/b)) provides a measure of the degree of risk aversion of the mar-
ket as a whole, R >R,measures the return on the market portfolio, and am
B ),(amnIn/bn) isa weighted average of the taxparameters faced by each individual in
the economy, weighted by the inverse of each individual's degree of risk aversion, b.This
equation is a simple generalization of the standard CAPM market line in a setting with
taxes.
Each firm f in each country n chooses its capital stock to maximize the value of
V1—K1,whichimplies that it chooses K1such that .9Vf,/t9Kf= 1.The firm uses
equation(5b) to forecast the impact of changes in its capital stock on its market value. We
assume that the firm is small enough that in doing so it takes am, r, B,andthe return on
the market portfolio, R,as given. Itsoptimal capital stock can therefore be characterized
implicitly by
(1—r)F+ r, =(1+ ar) + Bcov((1 —r)FO,R). (6a)
4This expression can be simplified using equation (5b) to yield
FV=1+(r( a,r
(6b F
The equation characterizing the equilibrium market interest rate can be derived in a
similar fashion. Equation (4a) implies that
(1/b)1n[p(1 + (1 —t)r)]=EC
—(bft/2)varC
—C. (7a)
But if we multiply each of the equations (4b) by s and sum over m, we find that
bvarC =E SRm— s(1 + amnr)Vm. (7b)
Substituting equation (7b) into equation (7a), summing over all individuals, and using the
budget constraints describingand C, we find that
+ (1 —tn)r)]=.5>2[ERm + Vm(1 + ar)] —>2(InWin,
—Ku),(8)
where cz = sIamn represents the simple average of all the a,, for each security. In
this equation, the first term on the right-hand side simply measures the certainty equivalent
amount of consumption in the second period while the second term measures first-period
consumption.
2. Characteristics of the Nash equilibrium for government tax policies
While we have assumed that no individual and no firm is large enough to haveany
market power, each government could well be large enough to affect market prices through
its tax policy. We assume that each government sets its tax rates so as to maximize the
expected utility of its residents, taking into account any effect of its decisions on market
prices. When a government considers what will happen to market prices, we assume that
it takes as given the tax rates chosen by other governments, that it assumes all individuals
and firms will continue to behave competitively, and that market prices will adjust so that
all markets continue to clear. Other more complicated games between governments could
be imagined, but this description of policy formulation seems to us to be quite reasonable.
Since taxes distort the allocation of resources, and any tax revenue is simply returned
in a lump-sum fashion to whomever paid it, taxes will seem attractive only if they can be
used to aid residents at the expense of nonresidents, through favorable changes in market
prices. If a government assumes that market prices will continue to satisfy equation (5b),
and that the parameters am, B, r, and R, will all remain unaffected by any change in its
own tax policy, then it follows quickly that the optimal tax rates are all zero. Without any
taxes, residents in the country will choose that allocation which maximizes their utility
5given these assumptions about market prices, and competitive firms will act in the best
interests of their shareholders under these assumptions.
However, when the government in some country iiusesits tax policy to change the
domestic use of real resources, the various market prices must adjust so that individuals and
firms in the other countries are just willing to accept the implied change in the resources
available to them. Using the model described in section 1, we can calculate the equilibrium
market prices for any given use of resources in country vi by aggregating the first-order
conditions (4a-b) across all nonresidents, holding fixed the resource use in country vi.
Following the same procedure that we used above, when we aggregated equation (4b) over
all individuals, we find that
ERm =(1+ am,_nr) Vm + B_ncov(Rm, R — (9a)
Here, arn,_n = is a weighted average of the individ-
ual tax parameters, as before, but now averaged over all the nonresidents, while B_ =
isthe aggregate risk aversion parameter for the nonresidents. Note also
that the appropriate market portfolio now equals the portfolio held by nonresidents. Sim-
ilarly, if we aggregate equation (4a) over nonresidents, we find that
(I/b)ln[p(1+(1 —t)r]
—.5ERm(1
—Is)+ (1 + r)IB
tn
—.5[1 + cr —I,s(1+ amnr)]Vm + IpC1p=0.(9b)
m
When a government considers changing domestic real decisions, K, and the
s, through its choice of tax rates, r,, t,, and the g,, it should therefore use equations
(9ab) to forecast how market prices change. In doing so, it should also take into account
how foreign firms revise their investment rates in response to changes in market prices,
as described by equations (6b). The resulting implications for government policy are
sufficiently complicated, however, that we will focus on a variety of special cases to shed
light on what should happen in the general case.
2.1 Market interest rates and foreign investment assumed fixed
We begin by assuming that each government takes as given the market interest rate,
r, and the amounts of capital, Km, invested in the other countries, but otherwise uses
equation (9a) to forecast the effects of its policies on asset values, Vm.6 The government in
each country vi therefore implicitly chooses K1, and s, to maximize the expected
utility of its residents, taking into account what equation (9a) implies about asset prices,
Vm.
Since the government takes the market interest rate as given, and so has no market
power in the world bond market, it has no incentive to change the decisions residents make
about how much to borrow or lend. Therefore, the desired tax rate on interest income,
6t,, is zero. To show this, we differentiate expected utility with respect to C,',,,giving the
first-order condition
=p(i+ r)Ee_bnn. (10)
(According to equation (9a), C1', has no effect on the Vm.) Comparing equations(4a) and
(10), we find that individuals make the socially optimal decisions about C,',only if t =0.
Equation (9a) does imply, however, that equity purchases by residents ofcountry n
will have an effect on asset prices. Since residents do not take these effectsinto account,
the desired tax treatment of equity income will be more complicated. Thefirst-order
conditions with respect to the government's implicit choice of thes are
ERm =(1+ r)Vm + (1 + r)I (s' —j(av/as:)+ bncov(Rm, ci). (11)
Here we find that to the extent that changing s raises theprice of an asset for which
the country is a net demander (s >.j,the opportunity cost of buying a share in that
asset, as measured by the right-hand side of equation (ii), is increased. (A similar effect
holds if the country is a net supplier of an asset.) Since individualportfolio choices are
characterized by equations (4b), the government can induce individuals to makeoptimal
portfolio choices by enacting tax rates on equity income from each asset such that
(amn —1)rVm=(1+ r)I (s —0)(aV/as). (12)
To see what happens to asset prices when domestic equity purchaseschange, we can
differentiate equations (9a) with respect to s and find that
= Rm)/(1 + a,_r). (13)
When country n purchases more of assetm, leaving less of this asset for nonresidents, the
prices of those assets which are substitutes (have returns whichcovary positively with that
on asset m) go up, and conversely.
Therefore, the government should discourage (encourage) ownership ofany asset which
is both a substitute (complement) for assets which thecountry demands on net and a
complement (substitute) for assets which the country supplies on net. Governmentpolicy
is in equilibrium when each country is simultaneously setting its taxpolicy according to
equations (12) and (13).
In order to shed further light on the characteristics of this Nash equilibrium ingovern-
ment tax policy, we consider a special case in some detail. In particular,assume that each
country is identical in all respects except that the random return on each country's technol-
ogy is different. Assume, though, that var(Rm) =afor all m, and that cov(Rm, R) =V
for all rnn, where ii <a. In addition, assume that initially the equity in each country's
firms is entirely owned by domestic residents, so that=0for m n.
7Given this symmetry, we can describe a country's tax policy by the tax parameter used
on income from the domestic security, ad, and the tax parameter used on any income from
foreign securities, a1. Similarly, we can let 5d represent the fraction of each firm owned
domestically, and sj represent the fraction owned by investors in each foreign country.
Since all shares must be owned, we know that 1 —Sd=(N
—1)sj.Other variables do not
vary by country or by asset, so we drop subscripts unless they are needed for clarification.
Under these assumptions, the set of equations (12) describing equilibrium tax policy
become





sj[(N—2)v+a} (1—sd)v (a1 —1)rV=(1+ r)IB
(1 + a*r)
—
(1+ a1r) ' (14b)
where a* =[(N
—2)a1+ ad}/(N —1)is a weighted average of the two tax parameters.
Since a > ii,itfollows by inspection that a1 > ad. Therefore, the tax law will treat
income from domestic securities more favorably than income from foreign securities. It
is easy to show that a1 > 1. At least as long as a/v ￿ (N —1)/(N
—2),which we will
assume, then also ad < 1. Each country will discourage its residents from owning foreign
securities, and encourage them to own domestic capital.
While each country subsidizes ownership of its domestic capital, foreign governments
discourage their residents from owning this capital. On net, we find that ownership of
capital will be discouraged, for if we examine the equilibrium tax parameter am in equation
(5b) for each asset, we find that
—1(1+r)IB((N— 1)v+a)(1—sd) 1 1 am— + rV L1+a*r1+air
But since a* <a1, the term in brackets is positive and am> 1. The optimal tax policy
therefore raises the required rate of return on equity, on net.
This use of tax policy to alter individual portfolios does not entirely disappear as
the number of countries gets large. If we allow N to increase, then in the limit it follows
from equation (14b) that a1 =1.However, also in the limit, we find that (ad —1)rV=
I,B (1—Sd) (ii—a),so that even as the number of countries increases, each country continues
to push its residents to buy domestic equity. Each country remains large relative to the
market for its own security, due to the fact that each country's security provides a unique
source of diversification. However, in the limit, tax policy has no effect on market prices
since in the limit am =1.
In contrast to this example, if we assume instead that each country's initial ownership
share in each technology also equals its desired final ownership share, so that=
forall m, then equation (12) shows that the optimal value of amn equals one for all
m —notrade takes place in securities, so there is no gain from changing the price of
8any security. This setting is the one examined by Ekern-Wilson(1974) and Leland(1974)
when investigating the investment behavior of firms. In general, our results show that the
government faces an incentive to restrict international trade in securities. But if no trade
would take place anyway, no intervention is needed to restrict trade further. The greater
the trade that would take place without intervention, the larger are the optimal tax rates
(in absolute value).
Given its use of taxes to distort individual portfolio decisions, the government will
also find it desirable to distort the capital investment decisions of domestic firms. While
domestic residents are subsidized to own domestic capital, given the amount invested, the
capital investment decision should be made taking into account the full cost ignoring the
subsidy. Therefore, to the extent that ownership is subsidized, the government should
impose a corporate tax to offset this subsidy. Formally, the first-order condition with
respect to K1 equals
(1 + r) [+>(— ) :j =sF,2.(ERa —bcov(R,C)). (15a)
in f'
Using equation (9a) to calculate the changes in asset prices, and simplifying using equations
(4b) and (12), finally gives
F,V1,,= (1+ r)I
(15b F,,,(i+r)I,,, —r(1—
Comparing this equation with equation (6b), we find that the optimal value of the corporate
tax rate is characterized by
1 + ar/(1 —r)= (1+ r)I,,,'
(16a) 1 + ar (1 + r)I,2. —r(1
—
Sincea,, < 1, we find that r,,, > 0. Therefore, capital investment is discouraged not only
because a,2.> 1 but also because of a supplementary corporate tax. Since 1 —a,,,,,,remains
positive even as N grows without bound, we conclude that r,,, will also remain positive in
the limit.
If I,.,,,,, =1,so that domestic firms are entirely owned domestically, the interpretation
of the optimal value of r is straight-forward, since equations (4b) and (15b) together imply
that
=(i+ r) + bcov(F,',,O,,,, (16b)
Tax policy has been designed so that the optimal amount of the domestic lottery, O,,, has
been sold to foreigners. Any more of this lottery would be absorbed by domestic residents.
As equation (16b) indicates, further investment in domestic capital is worthwhile until
domestic residents are just indifferent between the return on this investment and the
return from investing the same amount of resources in risk-free bonds. The corporate tax
rate would then be set so as to just counterbalance the subsidy to domestic ownership of
9equity in domestic firms. But if <1,domestic investment should be cut back yet
further since some of the loss from not maximizing V —K,,is shared with nonresident
initial owners.
If <1,then it is also the case that a country can seize a share of the residual
claim V —Kowed to foreigners by imposing a cash-flow tax on the finn, and returning the
resulting revenue not to the firm but to the domestic residents in a lump-sum. Asmany
papers have shown, e.g. Boadway-Bruce(1984), such a tax has no effect on investment
decisions, but raises as revenue a fraction of the true profits of the firm, which in our
notation equal V —K.
2.2 Endogenous foreign investment
So far, each government has been assumed to take as given the amount ofcapital
invested abroad when it decides on its tax policy. However, whenever asset priceschange,
the above model suggests that the amount of capital investment will change, andgovern-
ments might be expected to foresee this.7 If they do, the above results change ina variety
of ways.
Intuitively, when the government realizes that foreign investment can change, theper-
ceived supply curve of foreign securities becomes more elastic. Previously, whena country
purchased more foreign securities, the amount left for nonresidents decreased accordingly
and its price went up. This increase in price, however, should lead foreign firms to invest
more, attenuating the change in the amount of this lottery available to nonresidents, and
therefore lessening the required change in the per unit price of the lottery. Infact, we
show below that this increase in investment can be sufficient to lead theper unit price to
fall.
Developing this argument in a general setting results in sufficiently complicated ex-
pressions that we instead examine the special case in which the production function has
constant returns to scale, so that F =0,in each country. Here, the investment response
is maximized since there are no diminishing returns to inhibit thisresponse. One inter-
pretation of our previous analysis is that we assumed that F =—ooin all countries, so
that each firm's optimal capital stock is unchanged by policy actions.
Now that the amount available of each lottery can change, it willprove convenient to let S SjFmrepresentthe number of units purchased of the lottery from firms
in country m,andlet Vm Vm/Fm represent the market priceper unit of this lottery.
Similarly, we define Using this notation, we assume that the government
chooses values forr,,andthe S to maximize the utility of the representative resident,
given the effects of policy changes on the prices Vm.
In order to forecast how policy changes will affectVm, the government in each country




10Since F is invariant given the constant returns to scale assumption, and since thegov-
ernment assumes r is given, as are the Tm, for m ii, the only parameter thatcan affect
Vm is am, which is a weighted average of the amp for all values of p including n. Note that
even am affects Vm only if Tm0.
Since changes in still have no effect on asset prices, as seen in equation (17), it
immediately follows that the optimal value of t,,. remains zero. However, each government
can affect the value of its domestic firms' assets through r. As before, the government
will wish to restrict the supply of the domestic security to driveup its price, and in this
context will do so by imposing a corporate income tax. To see this, differentiate the utility
of each resident with respect to r, holding C' and the S fixed, yielding the first-order
condition
ft(8Vfl9KS'(9v—o 18 ' — . a
Using the definition of v,, and equation (17), this can be reexpressed as
—S +Erar 3K,=0 18b "'8r (1—r)(1+ar) 8r,
In order to learn how much K will change, we need to use equation (9a) to solve for how
much foreign purchases of domestic equity change inresponse to the change in the per
unit cost of the domestic lottery, so how much extra capital must be invested to satisfy
this change in demand. We find that





Substituting equation (18c) into equation (18b) and simplifying gives
_____— — S)(1+ ar)F,B_var(9)
(19) 1 —
—ar(1+ a,_r)
As long as each country is a net supplier of the equity of its domestic firms, we conclude
that each country will choose to impose a positive corporate income tax in order to drive
up the price of domestic equity. Even as the number of countries grows without bound,
each country will continue to use a corporate tax. This is because in the limit, as Ngrows,
we find that
=( — (20) 1—
The conditions characterizing the optimal values of the S also change considerably.
Due to the change in notation, the first-order conditions become
(1 + r)vm + (1 + r)I (S —)(8v/8S)+ bn.cov(Om, C?). (ha)
11As before, the second term on the right-hand side describes the effects arising from the
market power of the country, which each individual would ignore. In order to calculate
how each of the v, change, we first need to solve for the changes in the domestic tax rates
cr needed to lead residents to change S, holding everything else fixed. Differentiating
the individual's first-order conditions (4b), we find that
=—---cov(Op,6m). (21a)
Given the definition of a, we know that 3a/8S = Differentiating




Thisequation indicates that purchasing more of a foreign asset, rather than raising its
price and the price of substitute assets as before, now causes these prices to fall —the
investment response of firms more than offsets the change in the amount purchased. This
occurs since a cut in the tax rate domestic residents face on income from foreign equity,
inducing them to purchase more foreign equity, makes it profitable according to equation
(17) for foreign firms to invest until asset prices have been reduced.
When all countries are identical except for the differences in the °m, the special case
explored previously, then it is easy to show that ad > 1 and a1 < 1. When the supply
curve of foreign securities is downward sloping, the government should induce investors to
buy more foreign securities in order to drive down the price, and conversely with respect
to domestic securites. As a result, under these assumptions individual portfolios would be
tilted towards ownership of foreign securites.
2.5 Endogenous interest rate
So far, we have assumed that the market interest rate is unaffected by policy changes,
and so have implicitly assumed that aggregate savings is infinitely elastic with respect to
the interest rate. This assumption is clearly unrealistic.8 In contrast, Jones(1967) assumed
that the aggregate supply of capital was fixed when analyzing government policy with
respect to capital location. In this section, we will point out briefly how optimal tax rates
would change when market interest rates are endogenous, but foreign investment rates are
again exogenous.
If changes in some policy instrument x can affect market interest rates, then the first-
order conditions with respect to x must include an extra term (ÔU/är) (är/äx), to reflect
the influence of domestic policy on market interest rates. This effect would be ignored
by domestic residents. Let us therefore begin by examining ÔU/är. Carrying out the
differentiation, holding all policy instruments (C1, K, and s) constant but allowing
the Vm to respond, we find that
=pb[B + (1 + r) — s)"]
Ee_b,1 (22a)
12We know from equation (9a) that ôVm/ôr =—am,_n,Vm/(1+ am,_nr)<o• Ifwe assume
that am,_n =1,as would be approximately true if N were large, then the sign of ÔU/3r
equals the sign of+ >m(s — = Wm—C'
—>mKm. Thus, ÔU/8r >0
ifthe country is a net supplier of funds to the world securities market, and conversely.
In order to judge how policy changes would affect market interest rates, a government
is assumed to use equation (9b), which characterizes the market clearing interest rate,
conditional on domestic policy choices. The main way in which the government can affect
rispresumably through changing the amount of domestic savings, or equivalently through
changing first-period consumption. Using equation (9b), we find that 8r/8C1 =(2+
r)I/1, where Il represents the partial derivative of the left-hand side of equation (9b)
with respect to r, holding all economic behavior constant, but taking into account the
effects of ronthe other prices Vm. We assume that 1 >0,so that 8r/äC' >0. This
implies that the interest rate must be higher in order for nonresidents to be willing to
consume less in the first period and more in the second period. Therefore, the effect
of first-period consumption on market interest rates makes first-period consumption more
attractive when the country is a net supplier of funds, and less attractive when the country
is a net demander of funds. As a result, tax policy should be used to restrict the absolute
size of capital flows.'0 Therefore, interest income should be taxed when the country is a
net supplier of funds, in order to make lending less attractive. Similarly, interest income
should be subsidized to increase the cost of borrowing from abroad if the country is a net
demander of funds.1'
Calculating the effects of either K oron market interest rates leads to sufficiently
complicated expressions that we omit them from the paper. However, these expressions
suggest that an increase in investment, holding own savings constant, would require a rise
in interest rates. Similarly, if sisincreased, nonresidents must be content holding more
bonds and less equity which should require a rise in the interest rate. Therefore, if the
country is a net demander (supplier) of capital, investments in both real capital and in
equity are less (more) attractive due to their effects on market interest rates. Therefore,
everything else equal corporate tax rates and tax rates on equity income should be higher
(lower) if the country is a net demander (supplier) of capital.
However, as the number of countries gets large, equation (9b) indicates that each
country has less and less effect on market interest rates. Therefore, these additional com-
plications disappear in the limit as the number of countries grows.
3.Conclusions
This paper has shown that whenever a country is not a price-taker in the interna-
tional securities market, then it has an incentive to design its tax policy so as to restrict
international trade in these securities. For example, as a number of writers have argued, if
a country can affect the prevailing market interest rate through its net demand or supply
of funds, then it has an incentive to restrict the size of this net demand or supply. In fact,
Summers(1985) has argued that governments do indeed use their fiscal policies to restrict
their net demand or supply of funds, or equivalently to restrict the difference between
their savings rate and their investment rate. This use of market power may therefore
13provide one explanation for the observation by Feldstein-Horioka(1980) that among the
O.E.C.D. countries, the difference between a country's savings rate and investment rate
tends to be small.'2 We show, however, that this incentive to restrict the net flow of funds
is smaller for smaller countries. Indeed the evidence reported in both Summers(1985) and
Obstfeld(1985) is that the savings and investment rates for smaller countries are much less
closely tied than are those for larger countries.
In addition, we show that each country faces the incentive to restrict the amount
of equity in its domestic firms owned by foreigners and the amount of equity in foreign
firms owned by domestic residents. It can do so both by imposing a corporate tax on
its domestic firms, to restrict the total supply of their equity, and by imposing a set of
taxes on the income its residents receive from equity, to induce them to concentrate their
portfolios in domestic equity.'3 This use of market power may therefore also help explain
the very limited degree of international diversification that is observed empirically.
More surprisingly, we show that even small countries have the incentive to restrict
the supply of domestic equity available to foreigners, both by reducing the total supply
of domestic equity through a corporate income tax and also by reducing the fraction of
this total supply available to foreigners by inducing domestic residents to concentrate their
portfolios in domestic equity. These results on the design of tax policy in a smallopen
economy are in sharp contrast to those in Gordon(forthcoming), who examined optimal
tax policies in a similar model but without uncertainty. Without uncertainty, small coun-
tries are price-takers and should not distort corporate investment decisions or individual
portfolio decisions even when other sources of tax revenue impose efficiency costs.
As in models of tariff policy, we find that each country, acting in isolation, facesan
incentive to distort the allocation of resources (and of risk-bearing) in order to take advan-
tage of its market power. The net result may well be a loss in utility in all countries —ifall
countries are identical (except for the risk characteristics of domestic production), this is
certainly the case. Just as binding agreements to avoid using tariffs (such as GATT) should
raise the efficiency of the allocation of resources, binding agreements on tax policy should
also be attractive. Unlike the case of tariffs, however, governments normally wish to tax
savings and investment independently of attempts to exploit market power in international
securities markets. Therefore, formulating an agreement which prevents governments from
taking advantage of their market power in the financial securities markets and yet which
leaves them adequate flexibility in the design of domestic tax policymay be very difficult.
In deriving these results, we have used a somewhat specialized model. In particular,
we have assumed that individuals have constant absolute risk aversion, that all security
returns are distributed normally, that there are only two periods, and that there is only
one physical commodity. Together, these assumptions allow us to use a standard variant of
the CAPM model of securities prices. The assumptions also imply that purchasingpower
parity prevails.'4 Each of these assumptions clearly simplifies the algebra, but we see no
reason that these simplifications should change any of the qualitative conclusions from the
model.
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the authors and not necessarily those of N.B.E.R.
1. The most obvious example of such export restrictions is OPEC.
2. See, for example, Jones(1967), Gehrels(1971), Feldstein-Hartman(1979), or Hart-
man(1985ab), for further discussion. When a country has market power in both the capital
market and the commodity market, as in Jones and Gehrels, interaction effects add com-
plications.
3. Adler-Dumas(1983) show empirically that, even taking exchange rate risk into
account, the mean-variance efficient portfolio for an investor can be approximated by a
combination of nominally risk-free domestic bonds and a share of the world portfolio in
equity.
4. We therefore assume purchasing power parity. For a related discussion of use of
government policy to take advantage of market power with respect to exchange rates, see
Gordon(1985).
5. Existing tax structures do not normally differentiate directly between income from
foreign and domestic securities. However, a number of countries impose a dividend with-
holding tax on dividends from domestic firms paid to foreigners. If Rm is defined to equal
what foreigners receive on equity, then a withholding tax is equivalent to a subsidy on
ownership of domestic equity. Similarly, a number of countries have a dividend credit
which is available only to domestic residents on equity of domestic firms. The ability of
governments to differentiate between income from different foreign countries is assumed to
simplify the notation in the following discussion.
6. These assumptions correspond to those used by Stiglitz(1972) and Jensen and
Long(1972) in analyzing the behavior of a firm which is not a price-taker in the securities
market.
7. Since this response will be more gradual than the response of equity prices to policy
changes, forecasting its size would be far more difficult, however.
8. See, for example, Hartman(1984).
9. If, in contrast, we assumed that investment rates were endogenous, and production
functions were linear, then this derivative would change sign as well as form.
10. See Jones(1967), Hartman(1985b), and Feldstein-Hartman(1979) for similar re-
sults.
1711. There could also be an incentive to use government budget deficits (surpluses)
to reduce the country's net supply (demand) of capital. In the above model, however,
government fiscal policy would have no real effects.
12. The model does not provide support, however, for the inference by Feldstein..
Horioka that extra domestic savings leads to essentially the same amount of extra domestic
investment. Given our assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, at the margin any
extra savings in a country, holding its tax policy constant, is used to buy risk-free bonds,
and so results in a drop in the world interest rate and an equivalent expansion in investment
in all countries.
13. This last result can change if the amount of capital investment by firms is suffi-
ciently elastic with respect to the market value of its equity.
14. For a related argument concerning the incentives a country faces when it can
influence currency exchange rates, in a model without uncertainty, see Gordon(1985).
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